He visited Delhi for the 2,500th anniversary of the Buddha’s birth, but Nehru persuaded him to go back. In 1959 he fled from Lhasa and entered India, received warmly by Nehru. Has since been living in McLeodganj.
He presented a draft democratic constitution for Tibet, providing detailed guidelines on the functioning of the Tibetan administration- in-exile.
Tibetans in India and 33 countries worldwide elected 46 members to the 11th Tibetan Assembly on a one-man-one- vote basis.
The Karmapa Lama escapes Tibet and comes to Dharamsala.
He tells the Tibetan Assembly that he wants to relinquish temporal power. This brings to an end the dual spiritual and political authority of the Dalai Lamas.
hi, is believed to have gone off badly. Indian sources told india today that the Dalai Lama was “virtually kidnapped,’’put into an unmarked car with dark window shades as it drove into 7, Race Course Road, the PM’s official residence, that evening.
Asked about the meeting, the Dalai Lama laughed, but refused to say anything. As the sources put it, he was “visibly shaken” by the encounter. It seems Modi didn’t come out to receive him—unlike other PMs in the past. Moreover, he spoke to him in Hindi, which was translated into English. The Dalai Lama replied in English. They talked about a variety of things, including China.
It seems the Dalai Lama, his advisers and a Hong Kong-based Chinese businessman friend had been discussing a possible meeting between the Dalai Lama and Xi during the latter’s Delhi visit. It is believed the government wasn’t too happy with these developments and had made its views known to the Dalai Lama’s people.
Certainly, many things have changed in the new New Delhi. For a start, the new PM recognises the need to reconcile the leftovers of history and make good with India’s largest neighbour. The PM also knows that a sustainable relationship with China cannot ignore the presence of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan communi- ty-in-exile in India. Not because of the
so-called “Tibet card” in India’s diplomatic arsenal—which has been so watered down by Delhi over the decades since the Dalai Lama arrived— but because the Chinese leadership sees the Tibetan spiritual leader as a veritable red rag to its predominantly Communist Party identity.
It is widely acknowledged that the Dalai Lama’s escape in 1959 only aggravated the already deteriorating relationship between India and China, leading to the 1962 border conflict and several consequent decades of tension. But as China rises again, nationalist feeling against the distinctive but dissenting cultures of Tibet and Xinjiang is only growing. “China’s main problem with the Dalai Lama is that it wants him to accept that Tibet has always been an integral part of China. No Dalai Lama can accept that, as this is historically debatable,” says Nalin Surie, a former envoy to China.
In his August 2014 meeting with the Dalai Lama, perhaps Modi believed that the beautiful new relationship he was about to forge with Xi would be unnecessarily damaged by an 80-year-old Tibetan leader the Chinese love to hate, who happens to be living in his country. Whatever the truth, Modi’s subsequent conversations with the Chinese leadership in Ahmedabad, Delhi, Xi’an and Beijing
are said to have given him a proper insider’s perspective into the highly complex relationship with his big and powerful neighbour.
The Chinese are certainly keen on ramping up much-needed economic investment in India. But in recent years they have refused to consider a “status quoist, as-is-where-is solution” on the boundary dispute—that is, India and China keep the territories under their present control, Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin respectively, as was twice contemplated in the past by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping—and insisted that any deal with India must incorporate Tawang, plus some additional territory from Arunachal Pradesh.
Certainly, only a strong government with a large majority can politically afford to cede territory to China. During the Atal Bihari Vajpayee era, talk of a “soft border” between Tawang and Tibet—similar to the proposal to transform the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir into a “soft border”—often surfaced, which soon died a natural death. Since 2003, 18 rounds of border talks between representatives of the two governments have taken place, but to no avail. In the interim, China’s economy has grown by leaps and bounds, transforming not only the eastern Chinese seaboard but also the hinterland within. With the train from Beijing to Lhasa beginning